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THE FUTURE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN CONTEXT:
NEUTRALITY, RELIGION, OR AVOIDANCE?
INTRODUCTION
NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI*
Religion is not going to disappear from public life in the United
States any time soon. As William 0. Douglas said six decades ago in
Zorach v. Clauson: "We are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being."i According to the Pew Foundation, 86 per-
cent of Americans are affiliated with one religious faith or another. On
any given Sunday, Saturday, or Friday (depending on your faith) 41
percent of all Americans are in a church, a synagogue, a mosque, or a
temple, according to the Gallup Poll. We place "In God We Trust" on
our money. We salute the Stars and Stripes with the words "one nation
under God." We have national Christmas Trees and national days of
prayer and thanksgiving declared by our national government. Our
Congress uses chaplains to open sessions of both the House and the
Senate. Each branch of our national armed services employs a chaplain
corps.
At the same time, the First Amendment to our Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of
religion. Our founding document appears to say that there can be no
official, national recognition of religion and yet such recognition ap-
pears to abound, supported by a self-declared religious populace who,
when polled, say that they want it to abound, especially the assertive
religious Christian right that has become so highly visible in recent
years. It must be noted, though, that in recent years, there has been an
astounding growth in secularism and religious non-affiliation among
the American people. While the 86 percent believers figure cited above
seems impressive, that number is actually lower than it has been in
years, witnessing a downward trend in religious affiliation among the
* Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Neither this, nor any of the case citations that follow are my
original research. They are based on the work of the authors being cited, but are placed here for
the reader's convenience.
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American populace. This divide provides the context for our symposi-
um on the future of the Establishment Clause.
There is obviously a thorny question here: in this context, what
should be the response of government to questions of religious recog-
nition? Not just the national government, but state and local govern-
ment as well, ever since Everson v. Board of Education decided that the
First Amendment, via the Fourteenth Amendment, was applicable to
the states.2 Most importantly, what does our Supreme Court, entrusted
with the interpretation of our Constitution, say is the proper meaning
of the Establishment Clause: what does it allow the government to do
in regard to recognizing religious rights; what does it not allow the
government to do? What direction have our Supreme Court Justices
given to the nation, to the lower courts on this matter?
Confronting this issue of the ongoing meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause, six highly accomplished and talented professors of law
met at Duquesne University School of Law last November 3, 2011 in a
symposium entitled The Future of the Establishment Clause in Context:
Neutrality, Religion, or Avoidance?. The symposium was sponsored by
The Chicago-Kent Law Review. The speakers were the organizer and
guiding light of the event, Professor Bruce Ledewitz from Duquesne
Law School, Professor Christopher C. Lund from Wayne State Universi-
ty Law School, Professor Samuel J. Levine from Touro Law Center, Pro-
fessor Zachary R. Calo from Valparaiso University School of Law,
Professor Mark C. Rahdert from Temple University School of Law, and
Professor Richard Albert from Boston College Law School. Ledewitz
and Lund spoke on government neutrality towards religion; Calo and
Levine spoke on government recognition of religion; and the final two
speakers, Albert and Rahdert, spoke on the justiciability of Establish-
ment Clause issues.
Ledewitz's analysis of what the government can do and still re-
main neutral to a religious establishment is highly nuanced. Basically,
Ledewitz believes that the government can constitutionally use image-
ry that is considered traditionally religious when those images are
used to endorse secular values. Ledewitz says that the American peo-
ple as a people want to be able to express confidence in the future,
want to encourage what is worthy of respect in society, want to meet
national challenges. These are all clearly secular goals expressing ob-
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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jective values. None of these expressions violate government neutrality
towards religion mandated by the Establishment Clause.
Ledewitz then asks if these objective, neutral, secular value ex-
pressions can be expressed by the government, or with the endorse-
ment of the government, in religious imagery. Ledewitz believes that
they can be, primarily because this kind of religious imagery is not
exclusively religious in its meaning. The "God" mentioned in the Pledge
of Allegiance and the "God" mentioned on our dollars and cents can
mean the Lord, Creator of the Universe, to some; but to others, it may
simply mean an ideal value or the ground of being. When religious
terms are used in this way, Ledewitz says, violence is done neither to
the beliefs of believers nor to the neutrality of the government.
The same analysis applies to prayer at public school graduations,
at the opening of legislative sessions and other government ceremo-
nies. While for some, such appeals to the divine being do have a reli-
gious meaning, that is not their only meaning. They are just as capable
of being seen as stressing the seriousness of the occasion, the commit-
ment of those gathered to a common, unitive purpose.3
Ledewitz's view is a very irenic one. Rather than drive traditional
religious expression from the public square, he would like to see more
expressions of value in our public discourse. He would let ministers
and rabbis and imams speak at civil ceremonies, but also poets and
scientists, too. In that way, religious speech is seen for what it is: one of
many possible and permissible expressions of value and meaning by
the representatives of a secular society in a secular society.
Christopher Lund has difficulty, not with the sincerity or the in-
ternal logic of Ledewitz's position on the ways that government may
remain neutral to religion without eschewing the use of religious
terms, but with the hidden premise or the "lie" that he thinks is behind
it.4 The "lie" is that courts label governmental expressions that are
known to have religious meaning as being truly or primarily secular in
order to uphold the Establishment Clause's requirement of govern-
ment neutrality towards religion.
3. This, as Ledewitz recognizes, requires the overturning of Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.577
(1982) which prohibited prayers at public school graduations. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), permitting prayers to open legislative sessions, of course, would stand, although not for
the same reasons.
4. This is not Lund's characterization. It comes from Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholar-
ships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty,
118 HARv. L. REV. 155, 225 (2004), whom Lund credits.
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For this proposal, he cites the recent Kentucky case, Office of
Homeland Security v. Chisterson.s There the Kentucky Court of Appeals
examined the constitutionality of a state statute creating a state de-
partment of homeland security in which the Kentucky legislature said
in its legislative findings justifying the act that "[t]he safety and securi-
ty of the Commonwealth cannot be achieved apart from reliance upon
Almighty God... For as was written long ago 'Except the Lord keep the
city, the watchman waketh but in vain."6 Despite amicus briefs from
the legislators who wrote these words, insisting that they intended a
religious meaning, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found the statute
mostly secular, and therefore constitutional.
Lund also has trouble with the workability of Ledewitz's idea of
government neutrality. Atheists, Lund says, are unlikely to accept the
word "God" as a stand-in for an expression of their deepest values.
Their deepest values are that there is no God. On the other hand, if
Ledewitz is right, and atheists do accept such a meaning of "God" in
governmental expressions, those who truly think that this "God" is the
divine being who created them and the universe they live in, and who
seek the government's endorsement of this meaning of the concept of
"God," will begin to seek clearer government endorsements of their
views, leading to more civil and judicial strife.
There is also the matter of the indefiniteness of Ledewitz's ap-
proach. Lund is not sure how Ledewitz gets nonreligious meaning out
of religious symbols and words. He also does not see the conflict be-
tween believers and non-believers seeking government endorsement
going away, and rather than deny that conflict, he believes that the best
way to handle it is for the government to stay out of it completely, in
other words, complete neutrality. While giving full credit to Ledewitz's
desire to maintain a rich public discourse by not enforcing a strict gov-
ernmental neutrality towards religious expression, Lund believes that
a public moral discourse on the important topics of right and wrong,
5. 2011 WL 5105253 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011), as cited by Lund.
6. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.285(3) (West 2002) (quoting Psalms 127:1), as cited by Lund.
This is the Protestant King James Version, and by choosing that translation, as opposed to one like
the New Standard Revised Version that both Catholics and Protestants could accept, the Legisla-
ture was making another religious statement. The King James Version is also probably a slight
mistranslation. The Catholic Douay-Rheims Version says, "Unless the Lord keep the city, he
watcheth in vain that keepeth it." The New Revised Standard Version says, "Unless the LORD
guards the city, the guard keeps watch in vain." The Latin vulgate says, "nisi Dominus custodierit
civitatem frustra vigilat qui custodit eam." Vigilare can mean to be awake, to watch, to be vigilant,
or to keep vigil. The Septuagint says, " 00v pf Kuptog <pulakl 1ToAtv, En!) pagV MypumrVroEv E
<pulanatev."
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human dignity, and human equality is entirely possible without the
government taking a religious position, which is the only thing that he
says the Establishment Clause bars. (In fairness, he would also proba-
bly admit that, under Ledewitz's reading, the government's use of reli-
gious terms and symbols that are also capable of a non-religious
meaning is not the government taking a religious position; he just does
not find emptying such words of their religious meaning credible or
possible.)
Finally, Lund fears what he calls "cherrypicking," i.e., the govern-
ment eventually choosing images, symbols, words that are more indic-
ative of one religious faith than another, once it is agreed that the use
of such words and symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause.
At this point, Lund says, the fight will be over my symbols and words,
not yours, and the fight will be without any clear guidelines minus the
neutrality that he understands the Establishment Clause to require.
Speaking on the current status of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence and what ways the government can and cannot recognize reli-
gion, Samuel J. Levine finds the Supreme Court's views on the
Establishment Clause splintered at best. He cites recent U.S. Supreme
Court Free Exercise cases to support his claim that when it comes to
protecting the religious rights of minorities, under either clause, the
Court uses a majoritarian approach that is unsympathetic to non-
mainstream religions. Given the wide diversity in American religions,
and the arrival on the scene of secularists and non-believers in greater
numbers than before, this makes Establishment Clause analysis even
more complex.
Levine starts with a history of pre-Lemon v. Kurtzman7 cases deal-
ing with religious diversity: Douglas's sympathetic dissent in favor of
minority religious rights in McGowan v. Maryland,8 a case upholding
Sunday blue laws; Torcaso v. Watkins9 decided just weeks after
McGowan, striking down of a state law that required a declaration of
belief in God as a pre-requisite for public office; Engel v. Vitaleio decid-
ed just a year later, striking down required prayers in public schools in
New York; Abington School District v. Schempp,11 decided another year
later, striking down a Pennsylvania law that mandated Bible readings
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
9. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
10. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
11. 374 U.S. 203 (1962).
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at the start each public school day. These cases, Levine says, demon-
strate a Supreme Court that was sympathetic to minority religious
viewpoints, which led to Lemon itself, eight years after Abington School
District. Lemon struck down Pennsylvania and Rhode Island laws that
provided some financial support to religious schools, and gave us the
famous three part Lemon test. To pass Establishment Clause muster, a
law must: (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) have a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.12
Levine explains that, in the years following, disagreements among
the Justices about how to apply what appears to be a clear test pre-
vented Lemon from being the clear standard that it appeared to be in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. One of the factors leading to this
dysfunction, Levine holds, is an ongoing dispute on the Court about
how to value the viewpoints of religious minorities and nonbelievers.
March v. Chambers,13 decided in 1983, upheld the constitutionality of
the Nebraska legislature's practice of starting each daily legislative
session with a prayer by a state salaried chaplain. In his majority opin-
ion, Chief Justice Burger said that legislative prayer acknowledged "be-
liefs that are widely held among the people of this country."14 Levine
points out that the flip-side of Burger's statement is that the govern-
ment is free to ignore those who do not share those widely-held be-
liefs. In his dissent, Levine states, Brennan opined that a group of law
students being asked to apply the rule in Lemon to the "hypothetical"
facts of this case would have found Nebraska's practice unconstitu-
tional. A year after March, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnellyis
allowed as constitutional a Nativity scene that was included in a much
larger, but publicly funded, city Christmas display. Again ignoring Lem-
on in his opinion for the court, Burger simply said that it would be
ironic for the Court to find unconstitutional the inclusion of "a single
symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration
acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries."16 The plastic
reindeers on display pulling Santa in his sleigh were evidently suffi-
cient in number to water down the religiosity of the "single symbol" of
the Bethlehem scene. In dissent, it again fell to Brennan to point out
12. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613.
13. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
14. Id. at 792, cited by Levine (his emphasis).
15. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
16. Id. at 686, cited by Levine.
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the contrariness of holding a crkche scene not to be a religious symbol
with clear religious meaning, with its consequent deleterious effect on
non-Christian citizens.
In four cases that followed in the next ten years, from 1985-1995:
Wallace v. Jaffre,17 striking down Alabama's moment of silence for
prayer or meditation at the start of the public school day; County of
Allegheny v. ACLU,18 outlawing a cr&che scene on the county court-
house steps, but permitting display of a menorah and a Christmas tree
on public property; Lee v. Weisman,19 declaring nonsectarian prayers
by clergy at public high school graduations constitutionally impermis-
sible; and Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,2o allow-
ing the display of a cross on state capitol grounds, Levine writes that
the Court in decisions, which often split three different ways, failed to
create any unified Establishment jurisprudence.
In the 2004 case of Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,21
the Court failed to decided the constitutional issues involved in the
"under God" part of the Pledge of Allegiance on standing grounds, but
did provide three concurring opinions from Rehquist, O'Connor, and
Thomas addressing the constitutional issues, but without any prece-
dential value. But then, the following year, in the cases of Van Orden v.
Perry22 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,23 Levine thinks that
a roadmap begins to emerge for future Establishment Clause cases.
These were both five to four decisions, and both involved public dis-
plays of the Ten Commandments. The majority in Van Orden found the
display constitutional. Writing for a four justice plurality (himself, Scal-
ia, Kennedy, and Thomas), Chief Justice Rehnquist eschewed the Lemon
test as being unhelpful in dealing with passive monument cases, but
instead turned to history, as the Court had done in Lynch, to hold that
the Ten Commandments had an important value in legal history apart
from any religious meaning. The monument also was one of many on
state capitol grounds, emphasizing various aspects of Texas history.
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote, saying that, in context, the long-
17. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
18. 492 U.S. 572 (1989).
19. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
20. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
21. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
22. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
23. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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standing Ten Commandments monument on the Texas state capital
grounds had a "mixed, but primarily nonreligious purpose."24
In my opinion, that sounds very much like Professor Ledewitz's
thesis, that neutral, secular value expressions can be expressed by the
government, or with the endorsement of the government, in religious
imagery. Perhaps, this is the roadmap that Levine finds in these two
disparate cases, because in McCreary County, Levine points out, the
Court went the other way, this time holding, 5-4, against the constitu-
tionality of a public display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky
courthouses. The displays were initially stand alone, with no historical
context. And that appears to have been the difference. It seems to me
that the lack of context reduced these courthouse postings of the Ten
Commandments to clearly religious speech, while the history and con-
text of the Texas capital monument allowed Breyer's characterization
of a "mixed, but primarily nonreligious purpose."
On the other hand, when it comes to the presence of religious
symbols on public property, Zachary R. Calo thinks that the entire legal
analysis has been confused "by a binary understanding of the idea of
the secular." The secular, he says, has been understood according to
two dominant traditions in the western world: Christian secularity and
secularism. It is either linked to a theological understanding of how
religion and law should interrelate that privileges religion, or it is seen
as "standing over and against religion in a manner that fails to reso-
nate" with our country's own history and religious beliefs and tradi-
tions. In order to solve this problem, Calo writes, it is necessary to re-
conceptualize what the secular means.
The basic question in this dichotomy, according to Calo, is wheth-
er or not secular politics derives its grounding and logic from religious
insight. This requires a historical review, in which Calo disputes the
oft-heard assertion that the Enlightenment gave rise to the concept of
"secularism." In its origins, which Calo roots in early Christianity's rela-
tionship with the Roman Empire, first persecutor then ally, the secular
was not so much antithetical to religion as it was simply "apart" from
it. Note that "apart" does not mean "opposed." The secular was consid-
ered to be autonomous from the religious, but still, even the secular
derived "its meaning, foundations and logic from a theological account
of the world." This version of the secular is "secularity" or Christian
secularism.
24. McCreary Co., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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The rise of the moderns state, especially after the religious wars
that wracked Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gave
rise to a different concept of the secular in which there was a true op-
position to religion, based understandably on opposition to religiously
inspired violence. The Enlightenment expanded on this development in
western thought, and from then on, the secular was understood in the
sense of opposition to religion, as a means of reducing the influence of
religion on government and politics, as a separation of law from reli-
gion. In this separation, law is seen to have its own logic, apart from
religion, and religion exists only in a private, not a public, sphere. This
is secularism.
Secularity "seeks to maintain a link between the secular and reli-
gion, particularly Christianity in which the secular maintains an essen-
tially theological foundation." Secularism, on the other hand, "advances
a more totalizing rupture between religion and the secular." It is
against this dichotomy, Calo writes, that we must see the debate over
the public use of religious symbols.
American legal history has worked out its own version of this di-
chotomy, one in which our founding document, the Constitution, de-
nied to the national government any ability to recognize a religious
establishment, while at the same time coupling this religious freedom
"to strong public and political religiosity," thus combining, in Calo's
view, aspects of both the Enlightenment and Christian secularity. It
was a circular logic where "religious freedom was the foundation of a
democratic order that made religious freedom possible."
In the years after our founding, Calo believes, a robust Protestant-
ism was a kind of de facto Establishment25-a "Christian nationalism
in law and culture that undergirded the American tradition." With
nineteenth century emigration, this gives way to America as
Protestant-Catholic-Jew, the basis of a national religious consensus
that held until recent times, but no longer does, due to "the forces of
pluralism, secularism, and aggressive forms of resurgent religion." This
breakdown has led to the religious culture wars in which we now find
ourselves and has "pushed deliberation about the meaning of the secu-
lar ever more deeply into the realm of law and politics." The debate
about the meaning of the Establishment Clause must be seen in this
context. Calo writes that "The constitutionality of religious symbols
[has become] a referendum on the virtues of Christian secularity ver-
25. Calo cites MARTIN MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 35-36
(1970) for this phrase.
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sus secularism," and that "constitutional debates over the Establish-
ment Clause have become the situs of more elemental political and
cultural debates about the character of American public life."
So where does this leave us in the debate about the public use of
religious symbols. According to one side, they are "problematic be-
cause they violate the normativity of legal secularism and may be al-
lowed only because "their meaning has been denuded of any religious
or theological content." On the other side, the public use of religious
symbols is "permissible, at least within certain boundaries, on the
grounds that the Constitution does not demand secularism or the ex-
clusion of religion from public life." Calo finds that neither side "offers
an adequate and sustainable intellectual model by which to entangle
the current crisis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence." What is
needed, he says is "a way of rethinking the idea and content of secular
politics that moves beyond both the anti-religious impulses of secular-
ism and the exclusionary impulses of Christian secularity."
Calo finds this in a "higher law of secularism" This concept "is
premised on the idea that the binary currently shaping this jurispru-
dence rests on a false premise, namely that the Establishment Clause
must be interpreted in a manner that either advances the goods of reli-
gion or the goods of secularism." Higher secularism privileges neither,
but "rather advances a way of seeing religion as contributing to the
character of an open and plural society." The secular should not be
"framed as standing ineluctably in tension with religion," but rather
stands open to dialogue with it. It sees the goods of religion as a source
of insight into the secular. Here he agrees with Ledewitz's description
of higher law as not being narrowly theological or monotheistic in its
meaning. Higher secularism, then, is a "decidedly pragmatic and non-
ideological approach to overcoming a problematic cultural divide." It
does not attempt to settle this debate, but what it rejects about it is the
false dualism that it presents. In this understanding, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence becomes a place of "encounter, engagement and
contestation for which there need not be a settled univocal source of
meaning."
In this view, the Establishment Clause cases involving the public
display of religious symbols become questions of not of "the binary
between religion and the secular, but rather with the ways in which
religion has the capacity to shape the goods of the secular state."
In deciding whether to decide Establishment Clause cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court may be deciding more than simple standing or
716 [Vol 87:3
justiciability according to Mark C. Rahdert. Originally, under
Frothingham v. Mellon,26 taxpayers were denied standing to attack
federal spending measures in the federal courts. This remained the law
from 1923 until 1968 when Flast v. Cohen27 created an exception for
taxpayers who wanted to challenge government spending that aided
religion. This, writes Rahdert, seemed to be settled law until 2007,
when the Court's decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion28 without specifically overruling Flast, practically eviscerated it,
holding that there was no taxpayer standing to challenge President
Bush's funding of faith-based initiatives. True, the Court drew a distinc-
tion, saying that it was unwilling to extend Flast beyond legislative
appropriations to executive implementation of a spending program,
but Rahdert says that the rationale that the Court gave to deny taxpay-
er standing in Hein would apply equally to the facts of Flast
Rahdert believes that the final nail in Flast's coffin arrived last
year in the case of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn.29 While Hein was a pluraliy opinion, in Arizona Christian, a solid
majority of the Court concluded that Arizona taxpayers had no stand-
ing to challenge a legislative scheme that permitted state tax credits to
be given to an organization that funded private, primarily religious
schools. Again, lip service was paid to Flast, saying it should not be
extended from legislative appropriations to tax breaks, but Kennedy's
majority opinion clearly expressed the. dangers to the Article III limits
on the federal courts, noted in Frothingham, that allowing taxpayer
standing in such cases would create.
Apart from funding cases, Rahdert also notes Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow,30 the Pledge of Allegiance case, which the
Court ducked on standing grounds (the plaintiff was not the legal cus-
todial parent of the child offended by having to recite "under God" in
the pledge), and Salazar v. Buono,31 where the Court was in doubt
about the plaintiffs standing once the pubic land where the offending
cross was constructed had been transferred to private hands.
Whence this lack of desire by the Court to actually adjudicate im-
portant Establishment Clause cases? Rahdert provides two hypotheses.
First, he thinks, the Court simply wants to reduce the number of Estab-
26. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
27. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
28. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
29. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
30. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
31. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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lishment cases heard in the federal courts and denial of standing is a
way of doing that which will cut back on the number of such challenges
and, in the funding cases, allow those funds, absent effective taxpayer
challenge, to flow to religious organizations. Second, in an analysis that
he admits is much more speculative than the first, Rahdert thinks that
the Justices are buying time. They want to turn away from existing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but they have not yet worked out
what the alternative will look like, and denial of standing is, in this way,
a time-buyer for them.
To support his first hypothesis, Rahdert recites a brief history of
Establishment Clause litigation, explaining that Flast truly opened the
door to numerous suits in the federal courts challenging government
actions and government support in favor of religion. In the decades
just after Flast, Rahdert believes that the Court took a rather strict ap-
proach enforcing government neutrality towards religion. That neu-
trality, in the last two decades, has given way to a Court granting
government more leeway in acknowledgment of and financial support
of religion. But these two contrasting trends have evolved a confusing
state in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Trying to read the judicial tea leaves, with the substantial support
of his own impressive scholarship in the field, Rahdert predicts that
the standing issue will break out like this: Government actions that
involve regulations that "command and control" the populace have the
best prospect to create standing in the offended plaintiffs. Government
actions that communicate religious messages come next in their ability
to create a plaintiff with a genuine injury who could achieve standing.
Passive government use of religious terms and symbols come next,
with a high likelihood that no standing exists here absent some claim
that regular exposure to these symbols sets the plaintiff apart, espe-
cially when the exposure is either mandated or unable to be avoided.
At the lowest rung lie those cases where there is a financial relation-
ship between government and religion, unless the funded activity is
clearly and solely religious. Here, Rahdert thinks that recent Supreme
Court cases make the possibility of a plaintiff being able to allege any-
thing beyond a hypothetical injury slim at best. His conclusion is that
Court reform in this area is "meant to confine establishment litigation
to regulatory, ideological and symbolic measures." This he says will
leave next to no judicial oversight over church-state financial transac-
tions. Here, he writes," "the Establishment Clause is about message, not
money."
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Rahdert's second hypothesis is that the denial of standing is a way
of creating some "breathing space" so that the Court can decide where
it wants to take its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. He thinks that,
starting in the 1980s the Court has been divided not only over the doc-
trine of non-establishment, but also its application, and certainly the
history of Establishment Clause litigation summarized by him and the
other authors in this symposium substantiate that.
Rahdert sees some difficulties with this "breathing space" ap-
proach, however. First, the rule of four-the four Justices required to
grant certiorari-could allow a minority of Justices to place cases on
the docket that the majority would rather dodge. Second, denying cer-
tiorari does nothing to the law. Lower courts, which do hear cases, will
be stuck with the existing state of confusion, conceivably making bad
law. Third, it leaves the law unchanged and stagnant, which exacer-
bates the second difficulty. But "breathing space" is also attractive,
Rahdert says, also for three reasons: First, since taxpayer standing is
unique to Establishment issues, cutting it off here will not "spillover"
into other areas of the law. Second, this standing decision is "categori-
cal," that is, it is status dependent: the denial of taxpayer standing in
Hein and Arizona Christian means that no taxpayer similarly situated
has standing. Third, it will have an asymmetrical result, favoring those
who support state funding of religiously affiliated organizations, which
appears to be the status quo post Hein and Arizona Christian.
But while this makes one kind of Establishment Clause effectively
go away-the funding cases-it still leaves the others, the regulatory,
the government use religious speech cases, both explicit and symbolic.
This litigation will not disappear, and even the funding cases may
simply be driven to state, as opposed to federal, courts. Doctrinally,
Hein and Arizona Christian have equated government religious spend-
ing cases with other government spending cases, denying any particu-
lar harm because the object is religion. In Arizona Christian, Rahdert
finds a "positive pregnant" in the Court's position that it is not the role
of the courts "to adjudicate cases about religious taxing and spending,"
which in turn has the effect of increasing executive and legislative au-
thority in such matters, by effectively depriving them of judicial over-
sight.
This is fine, Rahdert writes, if you think that such financial rela-
tions between church and state are permissible; not so if you believe
that these kinds of church-state interaction were exactly what the Es-
tablishment Clause was meant to prevent.
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Richard Albert also addressed the standing issue in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. He confronts head on the
claim that made by Justice Brennan that Court "slams the door" on
plaintiffs whose claims it disfavors. Certainly, in Rahdert's essay, one
gets the clear idea that today's Court does disfavor those who would
use the federal courts to challenge government funding of religious
activities. Can this be the case? Do our Justices slam the courthouse
door on plaintiffs who have valid constitutional claims because they in
ideological disagreement with the tenor of those claims?
Albert's answer to this question is clear and comprehensive. He
begins with an assessment of religion and government at our founding.
While there was religious diversity in America of the late eighteenth
century, state establishments of religion also abounded. The Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights, limited as they were to the national govern-
ment, did not change this much. Certainly the First Amendment did not
dis-establish any church. Rather, Albert says, it is better understood as
a "federalism-enforcing device," preventing the national legislature
from interfering with state legislatures, which had established reli-
gions in their own states and even had religious tests for state office.
Albert finds these keynotes of "national interdiction, congressional
disability and state sovereignty," present at the founding of our nation
to be critical to any current understanding of the Establishment Clause.
But as our nation changed from its founding, so did the application
of the Establishment Clause. Making the First Amendment applicable
to the states, the Court decided in Cantwell v. Connecticut32 that Con-
necticut could not keep Jehovah's Witnesses from their religious pam-
phleteering. In Everson v. Board of Education,33 the Court upheld a New
Jersey law funding both public and private, religious school transporta-
tion. Both cases, Albert thinks, mark a shift in how the Court saw fed-
eral rights, from the founding when federalism was "a structural
protection for personal rights and a guarantor of interstate pluralism,
the Court began to see federalism as providing insufficient protection
for the nation's budding intrastate pluralism." The cases that followed,
striking down school prayer and Bible reading, Ten Commandment
displays in the schools, prohibitions on teaching evolution, subsidies
for religious school textbooks and teachers, Christmas criches on pub-
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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lic property,34 all were done by the Court to protect intrastate religious
pluralism.
Rooted deep within these decisions, Albert believes, is the under-
standing that religion is special, and because it is special, a governmen-
tal establishment of religion "is the paradigmatic public right that
touches all persons." It was this proposition that led the Court, accord-
ing to Albert, to create taxpayer standing to challenge government ex-
penditures in favor of religion, which we know happened in Flast v.
Cohen.35 In Flast, the Court took the Establishment Clause, which had
been seen as a wall separating government and religion, and created
from it the right of an individual taxpayer not to have his tax dollars
fund a religious organization. And Albert ties the root of this transfor-
mation, apart from the fact that standing was otherwise hard to
achieve in such cases, to his thesis that the Court wished to "constitu-
tionalize the specialness of religion." Giving any taxpayer the right to
make establishment claims is, in fact, to say that religion is different, it
is special. It sets religious rights apart from other rights under the Con-
stitution.
But despite the fact that Flast's creation of taxpayer standing in es-
tablishment cases has not been overruled, many scholars think it is
dead. Certainly Rahdert does. Albert describes this decline, citing the
cases that we have already seen, especially Hein and Winn. But this
decline suggests that religion is no longer regarded by the Court as
special. Albert disputes this. He says that when the Court first created
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, it did so "to grant
autonomy to the individual to choose or reject religion," thus indicating
the specialness of religion. It placed the locus of religious belief in the
individual and not the separate states. Now, with its post-Flast juris-
prudence, Albert sees the Court, not as diminishing the specialness of
religion, but simply moving the locus of its protection to the states.
And this fits in well with his thesis that the three concepts of na-
tional interdiction, congressional disability and state sovereignty, pre-
sent at the.design of the Establishment Clause by our founders, remain
critical to its present day understanding. In fact, Albert lays the demise
of an incorporated Establishment Clause to the re-emergence of these
three signposts in the Court's jurisprudence.
34. Citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and Allegheny Cnty. v. Greater Pitts-
burgh American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 572 (1989).
35. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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As to national interdiction, Albert points out that the dissent in
Winn notes that while "the national government is barred by the Estab-
lishment Clause from subsidizing religion and religious institutions
through the tax system, no similar constraint applies to state govern-
ments. National interdiction. He draws from Hein the proposition that
while Congress may not fund religious activities under the Establish-
ment Clause, it says nothing about the other branches of government,
such as Bush's executive branch faith-based program. He also cites
Hein for the proposition that the current Court has granted taxpayer
standing only when it involves a challenge to Congress acting under its
taxing and spending powers. Congressional disability. Finally, as the
Court minimizes taxpayer standing lawsuits, the states will be able to
exercise their own proper sovereignty in this area. Albert again quotes
the Winn dissent, to the effect that the denial of standing "offers a
roadmap-more truly, just a one step instruction-to any [state] gov-
ernment that wishes to financing of religious activity from legal chal-
lenge."36 State sovereignty.
The end result of this, Albert projects, will be the near-internment
of Establishment Clause litigation in the federal courts, since standing
will only exist where plaintiffs claim that Congress, under its taxing
and spending powers, has acted to aid or prejudice religion. This is not
a dead-end, though, because as Albert states, there remain state consti-
tutions with their own establishment prohibitions and state litigation.
There also remains the electoral process, where those legislators who
vote for or against what a person perceives as his/her religious inter-
ests or those elected members of the executive who do the same, may
simply be voted out or in on that basis.
November 3, 2011 was a very special day for Duquesne University
School of Law The eminent symposium speakers in The Future of the
Establishment Clause in Context: Neutrality, Religion, or Avoidance?,
Professors Ledewitz, Lund, Calo, Levine, Albert, and Rahdert, each as
much as the other, invited the audience into a deep, meaningful and
respectful dialogue on the future of the Establishment Clause. It is ob-
vious from my brief discourse on their remarks that they are not in
agreement, but they are models to follow any future Supreme Court
cases on the Establishment Clause. Their analyses were coherent, well-
thought out, clear and didactic as any court decision should be. We are
in their debt. I thank them, as I also thank The Chicago-Kent Law Re-
36. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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view for making their phenomenal scholarship available to a much
larger audience than those of us who were fortunate enough to hear
them in person.

